Normal view MARC view ISBD view

How internal transaction costs drive compensations [i.e. compensation] schemes [] / Groupe HEC, [Direction de la recherche] ; CNRS ; GREGHEC (groupement de recherche et d'études en gestion à HEC) ; Dominique Rouziès, Erin Anderson, Anne T. Coughlan

Auteur secondaire : : Coughlan, Anne T., ;Anderson, Erin, ;Rouziès, Dominique, Auteur secondaire collectivité : Groupe HEC, Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines, Direction de la recherche, Publication :Jouy-en-Josas : Groupe HEC, Paris : Chambre de commerce et d'industrie, 2004, 78-Jouy-en-Josas : Impr. du Groupe HECDescription : 1 vol. (41-VI p.) ; 21 cmISBN : 2-85418-802-0.Classification : 650Résumé : The literature on chief executive officers (CEOs) establishes that economic and sociological rationales are both essential to understand the level and structure of CEOs' compensation. Our thesis is that internal "transaction costs" or frictions override strictly economic criteria to determine pay levels and pay structures. We study mid-level jobs that have features strikingly similar to the CEO. We show that pay checks and their underlying structure follow counterintuitive patterns, as if the employers resorts to a third party (i.e. the customer base) to reduce employee discontent over pay. We also find that firms reward managers as if they have considerable value added..Bibliographie: Bibliogr. p. 36-40.Sujet : Coût Sujet Catégorie : ECONOMIE-FINANCES-GESTION
Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Bib. Paris
EMP C 149 (802) Available EMP62867D

Bibliogr. p. 36-40

The literature on chief executive officers (CEOs) establishes that economic and sociological rationales are both essential to understand the level and structure of CEOs' compensation. Our thesis is that internal "transaction costs" or frictions override strictly economic criteria to determine pay levels and pay structures. We study mid-level jobs that have features strikingly similar to the CEO. We show that pay checks and their underlying structure follow counterintuitive patterns, as if the employers resorts to a third party (i.e. the customer base) to reduce employee discontent over pay. We also find that firms reward managers as if they have considerable value added.

Powered by Koha